KELA

2026 Mid-Year AI Threat Landscape Report

July 2026

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Executive Summary

The Commoditization of the Agentic Threat

The year 2026 marks a structural inflection point in the cyber threat landscape, driven by the rapid commoditization of open-source agentic AI within the cybercriminal underground. While proprietary frontier models initiated this paradigm shift - most notably Anthropic's Claude Mythos, which pioneered Autonomous Vulnerability Discovery and Exploitation (AVDE), and its equivalent, OpenAI's GPT-5.5-Cyber - the immediate, operational threat originates from open-source alternatives. Threat actors are aggressively adopting decentralized, locally hosted models (such as Qwen, DeepSeek, and Kimi) because they lack safety guardrails and can be modified to bypass censorship. This accessibility enables AI systems to autonomously execute complex, multi-stage operations, reducing the vulnerability-to-exploit timeline from months or years to mere hours.

The Dual Threat Landscape & The Underground Economy

The cybercriminal underground has heavily commoditized AI, bypassing the restrictions of commercial platforms. Threat actors are commercializing AI through advanced Phishing-as-a-Service platforms (such as Bluekit) and automated deepfake bot tools. Ransomware groups, like "TheGentlemen," are actively integrating permissive, under-aligned AI models into their workflows for script development, log analysis, and extortion negotiations. To further accelerate these operations and find vulnerable targets, attackers are deploying automated reconnaissance platforms, such as MONST3R, to systematically scan for and harvest exposed AI infrastructure and API keys.

Cognitive Context Theft and Infostealer Evolution

As AI adoption accelerates, infostealer malware has evolved to target the "cognitive layer" of AI interactions. Infostealers actively exfiltrate local AI memory files (e.g., MEMORY.md), prompt libraries, and cached chat histories, exposing highly sensitive business logic. This threat operates at a massive scale, with KELA observing over 1 million unique machines infected globally between January 1 and May 1, 2026, accompanied by a sharp surge in macOS targeting that resulted in over 7,140 compromised macOS endpoints.

The Trust Collapse

The traditional “Trust by Default” security model has become a critical liability as adversaries increasingly weaponize identity infrastructure and internal agentic workflows. Attackers manipulate AI agents through "Vibe Hacking," coercing systems into acting as "confused deputies" to exfiltrate data. Concurrently, session hijacking has become a primary operational threat, with more than 49,700 active AI platform session cookies observed on dark web marketplaces, allowing attackers to bypass MFA.

Defensive Imperatives

To defend against machine-speed exploitation, organizations must adopt architectures fortified and prioritized by advanced Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI).

- CTI as the Early Warning System: Leverage CTI visibility into infostealer logs and darknet chatter as a "pre-crime" early warning mechanism. This enables SOCs to pinpoint compromised endpoints and quarantine local assets before exposed session cookies or unstructured AI memories can be operationalized by adversaries.
- Zero-Trust for Machine Identities: Eliminate trust-by-default for AI systems by assigning dedicated identities, enforcing least privilege, and requiring human-in-the-loop approvals.
- Machine-Speed Detection & Active Defense: Transition to AI-driven behavioral anomaly detection and deploy passive agentic honeypots to identify impossibly fast, non-human attack chains and unusual API egress.
- Shadow AI Governance: Mandate continuous discovery of unsanctioned "Shadow AI" and strictly containerize local AI agents using read-only filesystems to prevent lateral movement.
- Phishing-Resistant MFA: Enforce hardware-based authentication (FIDO2/passkeys) paired with strict session-binding to neutralize hyper-personalized social engineering and severe session cookie hijacking.

The Agentic Shift and Machine-Speed Exploitation

Introduction: The Commoditization of the Agentic Threat

The defining characteristic of the 2026 cyber threat landscape is the transition from assistive AI to agentic AI, a shift increasingly driven by the unregulated, open-source underground. Unlike earlier LLMs that functioned primarily as productivity enhancers, agentic systems demonstrate operational autonomy across the full exploitation lifecycle - vulnerability discovery, reverse engineering, exploit development, and chaining. This collapses the traditional attacker workflow into a single automated loop, executed at machine speed.

The catalyst for this shift was the emergence of frontier models in early 2026, notably Anthropic's Claude Mythos and OpenAI's equivalent GPT-5.5-Cyber. Mythos was the first to demonstrate true Autonomous Vulnerability Discovery and Exploitation (AVDE), utilizing agentic reasoning to ingest massive codebases and identify deep-seated flaws an order of magnitude faster than human research teams. Recognizing these risks, Anthropic initially limited access and established defensive consortiums like Project Glasswing.

However, the true operational threat facing enterprises today stems from the democratization and commoditization of these capabilities. While threat actors continuously attempt to bypass restrictions on frontier models - or use the "Mythos" brand as a social engineering lure for scams - their actual offensive operations rely heavily on open-source alternatives.

KELA's telemetry indicates that threat groups, including ransomware syndicates like TheGentlemen, are actively pivoting to more permissive, under-aligned LLMs such as DeepSeek, Qwen, and Kimi. These models can be self-hosted, lack rigid safety guardrails, and are deliberately manipulated to bypass censorship mechanisms. By leveraging open-source frameworks, threat actors have effectively secured "Zero-Day-as-a-Service" capabilities, allowing them to automate reconnaissance, script generation, and data parsing without the risk of API revocations or platform monitoring. The technical barrier to executing complex intrusions has been permanently lowered, significantly scaling the speed and accessibility of industrialized cybercrime.

TheGentlemen Leak: AI-Driven Ransomware Workflows

KELA observed on May 4, 2026, a threat actor operating under the alias “XxHDSandwichxX” published approximately 581KB of allegedly leaked internal communications associated with

the ransomware group "TheGentlemen" on the Exploit.in cybercrime forum.[1] KELA observed that the same post was posted the following day by two other users on two additional forums. The actor claimed that the remaining dataset was available for sale for USD 10,000 in Bitcoin.[2] Analysis of the leaked chats revealed detailed insights into the group's operational workflows, including task delegation, target coordination, and internal decision-making processes across intrusion and extortion stages.

The communications revealed several recurring AI usage patterns, including:

1. **Software Development and Scripting**

   The group frequently leveraged AI tools to develop, improve, and troubleshoot malicious scripts and operational tooling, while acknowledging the current limitations of LLM-generated code.

   - **Rapid Tool Development:** One member claimed to have developed the group's operational panel within three days using AI assistance, although noting that the generated code still required substantial human oversight and refinement.[3]
   - **Malware and Script Refinement**: During discussions regarding inadequate tooling, one member instructed another to use GPT to generate a log-cleaning script.[4]
   - **Utility Script Generation:** A member stated that DeepSeek and KIMI were used to create scripts and build a CRM platform.[5]



TheGentlemen Chats Leak (originally written in Russian) | KELA Platform

[1] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence
[2] Inside The Gentlemen Leak: How a New RaaS Captured 10% of 2026's Global Ransomware Victims | KELA Cyber
[3] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence
[4] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence
[5] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence

2. **Troubleshooting and Technical Support**

   Group members regularly used LLMs as a form of virtual technical support during intrusion operations and post-compromise activities.

   - **Log Analysis and VPN Troubleshooting:** One member reportedly supplied FortiGate CLI logs to DeepSeek in an attempt to diagnose failing IPsec and VPN connections.[6]
   - **Endpoint Security Evasion:** A member attempted to use AI systems to identify methods for disabling ESET antivirus protections, although internally complained that the suggested techniques were ineffective.[7]

3. **Circumvention of AI Safety Restrictions**

   The communications demonstrate clear awareness among operators regarding the safety guardrails implemented in mainstream commercial AI models, alongside active efforts to identify uncensored alternatives.

   - Jailbroken and Uncensored Models: Members shared references to modified and uncensored AI models based on Qwen 3.5, described internally as operating without refusal mechanisms or safety limitations.[8]
   - Preference for Chinese LLMs: The group frequently discussed Chinese AI models, including DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi, and Ernie, likely due to perceptions of looser content restrictions and reduced moderation.

4. **Social Engineering and Negotiation Support**

   AI tools were also leveraged to enhance victim engagement and extortion workflows.

   - **Negotiation Assistance:** Members described using GPT and Claude to assist with drafting ransom negotiation messages and professionalized extortion communications intended for victims.[9]

[6] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence
[7] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence
[8] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence
[9] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence



TheGentlemen Chats Leak (originally written in Russian) | KELA Platform

5. **Automated Reconnaissance and Data Parsing**

   The group also discussed future use cases involving AI-driven processing of large-scale exfiltrated datasets.

   - **Automated Analysis of Stolen Data:** Members discussed renting GPU-enabled infrastructure to host local uncensored AI models capable of processing large volumes of stolen corporate data. According to the discussions, the objective was to automatically identify credentials, administrative panels, and sensitive operational information without triggering AI censorship controls.[10]

The leaked communications suggest that TheGentlemen ransomware group does not perceive AI as a fully autonomous offensive capability, but rather as an **operational accelerator that enhances efficiency across development, troubleshooting, reconnaissance, and victim interaction workflows.** The observed interest in self-hosted and uncensored open-source models further reflects an evolving ransomware tradecraft model in which AI is increasingly integrated into day-to-day operational processes.

[10] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence

Technical Foundations of Autonomous Vulnerability Discovery & Exploitation (AVDE)

The strategic differentiator of the current era is Autonomous Vulnerability Discovery and Exploitation (AVDE). Traditional automated scanning relies on pattern-matching for known N-day vulnerabilities or surface-level misconfigurations. In contrast, modern agentic AI utilizes advanced reasoning to perform "logical chaining" - ingesting massive codebases, hypothesizing vulnerabilities, and deploying debuggers in isolated environments to validate its findings. This allows autonomous systems to identify deep-seated flaws in extensively audited software, including memory-unsafe languages like C and C++, an order of magnitude faster than human research teams.

While proprietary frontier models set the performance benchmarks for these capabilities, the threat has rapidly expanded to open-source environments. The effectiveness of these models is quantified by the CyberGym Score, a benchmark derived from the UK Government's 32-step "The Last One" (TLO) simulated attack, which measures the AI system's success rate in autonomously identifying, developing, and executing complex, chained vulnerabilities across a corporate network.

The Collapse of the Patching Window: From Months to Minutes

In the pre-agentic era, the "Vulnerability-to-Exploit" (VTE) timeline provided a manageable window for defenders to test and deploy patches. Agentic workflows have disrupted this metric, compressing the exploit lifecycle from years or months to hours. This creates immense systemic accumulation risk for the global cyber defense sector; if exploitation occurs globally before a patch is even conceptualized, the financial fallout becomes uncontainable.

The "Machine-Speed Exploitation" of N-day vulnerabilities is particularly concerning when applied to open-source and locally run models. The moment a patch is released, agentic models can reverse-engineer the fix to identify the original flaw and generate weaponized code. This effectively provides "Zero-Day-as-a-Service" capabilities to lower-skilled actors, who can now operationalize sophisticated exploits as quickly as elite state-sponsored groups.

Agentic Cyber Espionage: Subversion and Autonomous Execution

State-sponsored and advanced cybercriminal actors are rapidly integrating these capabilities into active operations, as illustrated in the abovementioned example of TheGentlemen Ransomware group. While initial proof-of-concepts emerged around restricted platforms, the broader availability of unrestricted frameworks has allowed threat actors to orchestrate the first reported AI-led espionage and automated intrusion campaigns.

Agentic AI functions as a cross-cutting execution layer that automates major portions of the attack lifecycle across a distinct set of automation buckets:

- Low-level cybercrime (fraud, credential abuse): AI lowers the barrier to entry by automating reconnaissance, phishing generation, and credential exploitation, enabling non-technical actors to perform advanced operations.
- Organized cybercrime (ransomware, access brokers): Agentic systems streamline the full attack pipeline, from victim identification and exploit execution to data monetization and extortion workflows, increasing scale and operational speed.
- Advanced persistent threat (APT) activity: State-aligned actors leverage agentic AI for precision automation in reconnaissance, vulnerability chaining, and stealthy intrusion operations, reducing human workload while increasing operational tempo and adaptability.

Case Study: The GTG-1002 Espionage Agentic Shift

A prime example of this operational evolution is the China-aligned APT group tracked as GTG-1002. Moving away from conventional AI-assisted intrusion methods, the group transitioned to a fully AI-orchestrated espionage model. By integrating custom autonomous attack frameworks with advanced agentic reasoning, GTG-1002 bypassed standard alignment protocols to interpret complex target environments, adapt to localized conditions, and execute real-time tactical decisions with minimal human oversight.

Technical findings indicate that GTG-1002 automated approximately 80–90% of the end-to-end intrusion workflow. This included autonomous vulnerability discovery - such as identifying zero-day weaknesses in proprietary codebases - followed by the generation and deployment of tailored exploits, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data prioritization. This high degree of automation enabled the group to significantly reduce breakout time and scale operations across multiple sectors globally, demonstrating how agentic execution drastically compresses the defensive response window.

AI-Driven Execution Across the Attack Chain

Recent research from Anthropic[11] and Fortinet[12] indicates a broader structural shift in how cyber operations are conducted across both nation-state and cybercrime ecosystems: agentic AI is increasingly functioning as a cross-cutting execution layer that automates major portions of the attack lifecycle.

This trend can be understood through a set of **automation buckets that apply across different threat actor types**:

- Low-level cybercrime (fraud, credential abuse, opportunistic attacks): AI lowers the barrier to entry by automating reconnaissance, phishing generation, and credential exploitation, enabling non-technical actors to perform advanced operations.
- Organized cybercrime (ransomware, access brokers, infostealers): Agentic systems streamline the full attack pipeline, from victim identification and exploit execution to data monetization and extortion workflows, increasing scale and operational speed.
- Advanced persistent threat (APT) activity: State-aligned actors leverage agentic AI for precision automation in reconnaissance, vulnerability chaining, and stealthy intrusion operations, reducing human workload while increasing operational tempo and adaptability.
- Hybrid and service-based ecosystems: Across both criminal and state-linked environments, AI-powered "shadow agents" and automated tooling are increasingly shared or commoditized, creating a unified layer of execution that spans multiple threat tiers.

Overall, this reflects a convergence where agentic AI is not limited to a single class of actor, but is instead reshaping the entire threat landscape by automating key components of the attack lifecycle across all levels of sophistication.

Threat Actor Chatter and Observed Cybercrime Activity

KELA observed on April 26, 2026 that a threat actor operating under the alias "WrokGuy" promoted an **"unrestricted AI execution system"** named NEXUS-0X on an underground forum. The offering explicitly advertises autonomous execution capabilities, including the ability to **generate exploits on demand, bypass security controls, and execute attack commands without user confirmation.** The actor emphasizes a "no restrictions" model designed to

[11] Disrupting the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign
Threat Intelligence Report: August 2025
[12] The Fortinet 2026 Global Threat Landscape Report Reveals a Surge in AI-Enabled Cybercrime, Contributing to a 389% Increase in Ransomware Victims Year-over-Year.

perform end-to-end offensive tasks - such as credential compromise, data exfiltration, and trace removal - with minimal user input. While these claims are likely exaggerated, the messaging reflects a growing demand within underground communities for **AI systems functioning as active execution layers**, rather than assistive tools, capable of independently progressing through multiple stages of an intrusion workflow.[13]



Underground Promotion of "NEXUS-0X" AI Hacking Tool

From a defensive perspective, this introduces several implications:

- **Reduced detection window:** Activities that previously unfolded over hours or days may now occur within minutes
- **Higher operational consistency**: Fewer human errors, more systematic exploration of attack surfaces
- **Increased pressure on response functions:** Traditional, manual triage and containment workflows are insufficient against machine-speed execution

Importantly, this shift does not eliminate the role of the human operator but repositions it upstream - toward tasking, oversight, and post-exploitation decision-making. **The technical barrier to executing complex intrusions is therefore reduced, while the scale and speed of operations increase.**

Overall, autonomous execution should be understood not as full independence, but as high-confidence operational automation within defined objectives, significantly altering both attacker tradecraft and defender response requirements.

[13] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence

The Dual Threat of AI Manipulation: Vibe Hacking vs. AI-Enhanced Social Engineering

The rapid adoption of AI systems across enterprise environments has introduced a dual-layered threat model: adversaries are simultaneously targeting AI systems themselves and the humans interacting with them. This convergence marks a shift from traditional exploitation toward cognitive and contextual manipulation, where trust - both human and machine - is the primary attack surface.

Attacking the AI: The Rise of "Vibe Hacking"

Some threat actors have been observed moving away from explicit "ignore all previous instructions" prompts. Instead, they use Vibe Hacking - a technique where the attacker contextually reframes a malicious objective to align with the AI's persona or perceived mission. By "hacking the vibe" of a legitimate workflow, attackers bypass safety filters that look for keywords, focusing instead on the AI's logical willingness to assist. Rather than attempting to override safety guardrails directly, attackers **reframe malicious intent as legitimate operational tasks**, exploiting the probabilistic reasoning and goal-oriented behavior of modern AI systems. This approach aligns particularly well with **agentic AI architectures**, where models are embedded into workflows and granted autonomy.

Threat Actor Chatter and Observed Cybercrime Activity

Example 1: Abuse of MCP-Based AI Coding Agents for Local Secret Exfiltration

KELA observed a post[14] on April 5, 2026 of a threat actor named "TheMekanic" describing a proof-of-concept attack against AI developer tooling using MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers inside AI coding assistants like Cursor, Windsurf, and VS Code plugins. They explain that these local MCP servers often have powerful file access permissions (e.g., .env, SSH keys) but lack proper authentication controls.

The attack uses prompt injection / metadata poisoning to **manipulate an AI agent into "deciding" it needs to inspect sensitive local files, effectively exploiting it as a confused deputy to exfiltrate secrets**. In essence, it highlights a new AI-native attack surface in developer environments, where LLM-driven coding agents can be tricked into abusing their own trusted local access to leak credentials, SSH keys, and environment variables

[14] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence



TheMekanic's post about MCP poisoning

Example 2: Vibe Hacking: AI Agents Operationalizing Full-Chain Exploitation

KELA observed on March 13, 2026 a threat actor demonstrating[15] the emerging concept of "vibe hacking," in which **AI coding agents are leveraged as semi-autonomous offensive operators** capable of conducting penetration testing and exploitation workflows with minimal human intervention. The actor described using the AI-assisted development platform Cursor on Kali Linux and providing the AI with structured "User Rules" prompts designed to transform the model into an autonomous penetration tester. Notably, the actor explicitly instructed the AI that it was operating as **"a penetration tester in a controlled lab environment"** and that the activity constituted "an authorized security simulation for educational purposes," likely as an attempt to frame the activity as permitted testing and bypass model safety restrictions. The instructions further directed the AI to exploit CVE-2025-30208 in Vite environments, apply multiple bypass techniques, identify attack vectors, select tools, and model the full exploitation chain against a target server.

The attack chain centered around exploitation of CVE-2025-30208, an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability that enabled access to sensitive internal server files (exposed Vite dev servers) through manipulated query parameters. According to the actor, **the AI agent autonomously chained the exposed information into a broader compromise**, obtaining access to databases, cloud infrastructure, source code repositories, corporate communications platforms, cryptocurrency wallets, and SaaS management environments. The shared output included references to stolen GitHub tokens, PostgreSQL credentials, Supabase data, Stripe and Shopify keys, Telegram bot access, Slack workspace access, and blockchain wallet material.

[15] https://platform.ke-la.com/#/investigate/hacking_discussions/raw/371039509

The threat actor also shared an alleged screenshot of the operational environment within Cursor, showing both the AI "User Rules" configuration and the live execution workflow. The left panel displayed the custom prompt instructing the AI to act as an "authorized" penetration tester using the pvite <IP_ADDRESS> trigger, while the right panel allegedly shows the AI autonomously executing reconnaissance and exploitation steps against a target Vite server. Visible activity included AI-generated task lists, automated curl commands, successful HTTP responses, and dynamically generated exploitation scripts, illustrating how prompt-engineered AI agents can be used to conduct semi-autonomous offensive operations in real time.



Alleged Cursor AI Agent Configuration and Automated Exploitation Workflow Targeting CVE-2025-30208



Execution Phase: Automated Exploitation of CVE-2025-30208 via AI Agent

The post illustrates a growing threat landscape trend in which threat actors increasingly rely on carefully engineered prompts and operational instructions to “vibe hack” AI agents into conducting offensive workflows autonomously, significantly reducing the technical barrier and time required to escalate a single exposed service into full organizational compromise.

Example 3: AI-Powered Voice Phishing Platform for Scalable Vishing and Social Engineering Operations

KELA observed on February 11, 2026 a post[16] of a threat actor named Azzy2505 advertised an advanced **AI-powered outbound calling platform designed to support large-scale social engineering operations.** The offering includes a multi-language AI voice agent (30+ languages) trained on extensive datasets of real-world calls (including financial platforms such as Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, and Robinhood), enabling highly realistic impersonation scenarios. Per the actor's claim, the system supports automated outbound calling at scale (up to 100 concurrent calls), integrated with Telegram for real-time monitoring, transcripts, and alerts.

Notably, the alleged tool incorporates AI-driven human vs. machine detection and a "receptionist mode" capable of navigating corporate phone systems (DTMF), allowing the AI to bypass gatekeepers and reach intended targets. The actor also emphasizes low-cost global voice routing and claims high success rates in generating call transfers, indicating operational use in fraud or vishing campaigns.

This post reflects the increasing commoditization of AI-enhanced vishing infrastructure, lowering the barrier for threat actors to conduct scalable, multilingual, and highly convincing voice-based social engineering attacks, particularly targeting financial services.



Azzy2505's post promoting their AI-vishing service

[16] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence

Example 4: "Bluekit" Phishing-as-a-Service Platform Offering AI-Enhanced Credential Harvesting Capabilities

KELA observed on March 26, 2026 a post[17] of a threat actor named "petrushka" advertising a beta-stage phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) dashboard. The service is positioned as an alternative to known adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) platforms such as Evilginx-based ecosystems and similar commercial phishing kits. The actor markets the platform as a fully managed subscription service with low entry barriers, explicitly targeting both "security researchers" and threat actors. The offering emphasizes ease of access, anonymity (Tor registration and Monero payments), and minimal verification requirements. Advertised capabilities include:

- Prebuilt phishing templates for 40+ major websites
- On-demand cloning of additional target sites
- Automated domain registration and hosting capabilities
- Full 2FA interception with session emulation and geolocation spoofing
- Multi-channel alerting (Telegram, browser notifications, auto-refresh tracking)
- Anti-bot and cloaking mechanisms for detection evasion
- Expanded data capture beyond cookies, including local storage and keystroke logging
- Infrastructure described as "decentralized" and "bulletproof"
- **Additional modular features including AI assistance, VM detection, voice cloning, and email sending capabilities**

This case demonstrates the ongoing professionalization of phishing ecosystems into full-service, subscription-based platforms that lower technical barriers for attackers while integrating advanced evasion, automation, and AI-enabled features to scale credential theft operations.

[17] KELA Cyber



Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service Dashboard Advertised as Evilginx Alternative with AI

Example 5: AI-Driven Deepfake-as-a-Service Platform for Automated Visual Manipulation

KELA observed on April 20, 2026 a post[18] where a threat actor named "SauceyPlug" advertises a suite of **AI-powered media manipulation tools.** The actor claims to provide access to bots and web platforms capable of performing a range of deepfake operations, directing users to a dedicated channel and website showcasing visual demonstrations.

The core innovation being commercialized is the **industrialization of AI-based synthetic media generation for malicious use**, lowering the barrier to advanced visual manipulation. The advertised capabilities include automated "faceswaps," clothing alteration, "undressing" simulations, and broader image and video editing functions. This reflects the **increasing**

[18] KELA Cyber

accessibility of high-quality generative AI tools for cybercriminal purposes, enabling scalable content manipulation and potential harassment campaigns.



AI Deepfake & Manipulation Bot Toolkit Advertised by Threat Actor SauceyPlug

Furthermore, this case also highlights the rapid commodification of generative AI for malicious use, where advanced deepfake capabilities are packaged as easy-to-use cybercrime services, significantly lowering technical barriers and increasing the scale and accessibility of visual manipulation and abuse.

The Insider AI Threat (Inter-Agent Trust Exploitation)

As more organizations implement agentic AI systems into enterprise workflows, a new attack surface is emerging - one that shifts the idea of an "insider threat" away from human actors and toward autonomous software agents operating with delegated authority.

In these environments, AI agents are designed to interact with one another, share contextual data, and execute tasks across tools, APIs, and business systems. This creates a dense web of implicit trust relationships, where one agent assumes that instructions received from another agent or system component are legitimate. Once this trust layer is compromised, it can be exploited to propagate malicious instructions laterally across interconnected workflows - effectively turning a single compromised agent into a scalable intrusion mechanism.

Unlike traditional attacks that rely on credential theft or direct system exploitation, this model enables adversaries to operate within the **logic of the system itself, leveraging expected agent behavior rather than breaking it.**

Threat Actor Chatter and Observed Cybercrime Activity

Shadow AI Abuse: Exploitation of Agentic Identity Endpoints

KELA observed on March 13, 2026 a post[19] of a threat actor named "TheMekanic" describing a technique for abusing "agentic identity" endpoints integrated into enterprise environments

[19] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence

where **companies have deployed AI assistants such as copilots or custom GPT-based agents** within internal dashboards.



"TheMekanic" Describes Exploitation of Agentic Identity APIs

The actor outlines that these AI agent interfaces often expose dedicated API endpoints (e.g., /api/v1/agent/query, /mcp/chat) which may **lack the same security controls as traditional authentication flows,** including weak rate limiting and absence of challenge mechanisms.

The described attack chain involves:

- Endpoint discovery of AI-specific interfaces used by embedded agents
- Prompt injection, where malicious "task-like" instructions are issued to the AI agent (e.g., requesting sensitive data under the guise of a legitimate query)
- Token capture, extracting the agent's Bearer authentication token generated during interaction
- Token reuse, leveraging the stolen token to bypass standard authentication and gain access to the underlying application session

The post highlights how **AI agent integrations can introduce a parallel authentication and execution layer that is not fully aligned with traditional security controls.** This creates opportunities for attackers to exploit agent-driven trust flows, using prompt-based manipulation to pivot into session hijacking and unauthorized access.

The Infostealer Evolution: Harvesting the Agentic Plaintext Layer

According to KELA telemetry, infostealer malware remains the primary fuel for the global cybercrime ecosystem, driving account takeovers, initial access brokerage, and downstream ransomware operations. However, analysis of early 2026 data reveals a critical trend: while the overall volume of global infections is experiencing a minor numerical normalization, the qualitative risk and targeting sophistication of these attacks have reached unprecedented heights.

During 2025, KELA identified approximately 3.92 million unique infected machines globally. Between January 1 and May 1, 2026, KELA observed over 1 million unique infected machines. While an annualized projection of 2026 data (~3 million infections) indicates a slight stabilization in raw numbers, the underlying threat is amplifying due to a massive structural shift in what these infostealers are harvesting and who they are targeting:

- The Proliferation of macOS Infections: Historically a minor niche, macOS targeted infections have surged exponentially. KELA's State of Cybercrime 2026 Annual Report noted that macOS infections grew from fewer than 1,000 compromised machines in 2024 to more than 70,582 in 2025. This momentum remains severe in 2026, with KELA tracking more than 7,140 unique infected macOS endpoints in the first four months alone, representing a continuous high-leverage vulnerability as high-value developers and corporate executives increasingly operate on macOS infrastructure.
- Targeting the Cognitive Plaintext Layer: Modern infostealer families (such as StealC, Remus, Acreed, and RedLine) have evolved their "grabber" functionalities beyond traditional passwords and crypto wallets. They now explicitly target the local AI interaction layer. As enterprises and developers adopt local AI frameworks, browser-integrated copilots, and desktop agents, infostealers are systematically exfiltrating local AI memory files (e.g., MEMORY.md), local prompt libraries (/prompts directories), and cached chat histories.

When harvested by infostealer malware, these assets grant threat actors direct visibility into proprietary business logic, operational strategy, internal system instructions, and sensitive user contexts that employees externalize into AI assistants. Consequently, a single endpoint infection no longer just exposes static credentials; it yields the entire operational and cognitive blueprint of the enterprise.

Threat Actor Chatter and Observed Cybercrime Activity

KELA observed a post[20] (originally written in Russian) on February 27 by a threat actor named "La_zet" advertising "GhostLoader," a native **macOS infostealer combined with RAT capabilities**, offered under a revenue-sharing model. The malware is positioned as a "unique" Node.js-based project featuring full infection lifecycle support, including persistence (LaunchAgent, shell hooks), anti-analysis protections, and a command-and-control (C2) infrastructure with real-time bot management and tasking.

Per the actor, the payload focuses on extensive credential and data harvesting, including:

- macOS Keychain and iCloud Keychain data
- Browser credentials and session hijacking via CDP ("Ghost Mode")
- Cryptocurrency wallets and seed phrases (BIP-39 scanning)
- SSH keys, .env files, and cloud credentials
- Apple-native data sources (Notes, iMessages, Mail)
- Notably, the stealer explicitly targets: **AI-agent configurations, including API keys and messenger tokens**

This activity illustrates the **evolution of infostealers toward multi-platform, AI-aware credential theft ecosystems, while also confirming the accelerating professionalization of macOS malware operations.**

[20] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence

GhostLoader macOS Infostealer + RAT – Feature Overview and Data Theft Capabilities | KELA platform

AI Session Hijacking: The High-Leverage Entry Point

In the age of persistent AI-powered interfaces and agentic environments, session hijacking has become a more potent threat than traditional password theft. Because enterprise AI tools often maintain long-lived authenticated sessions to support continuous workflows and tool integrations, stealing a static password is often a futile exercise against Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). However, session hijacking - stealing active session tokens or "cookies" - allows an attacker to step into the user's digital shoes, bypassing MFA entirely, unless the service enforces token binding, strong session risk controls, short expiry, or re-authentication.

As for the scale, at the time of writing, a search across KELA's data lake for the domains openai.com, claude.ai, gemini.google.com, perplexity.ai, cursor.com, n8n.io, and deepseek.com revealed **more than 49,700 active cookies** specifically associated with these services, indicating a substantial and continuously exposed pool of active AI sessions that could be leveraged for unauthorized access and downstream exploitation.

The Mechanics of the Hijack

By harvesting active session tokens for AI platforms, attackers function as the authenticated user in real time. For an organization, a hijacked AI-related service session is a high-leverage entry point that exposes more than just data; it exposes the organization's proprietary "autonomous logic". These risks include:

- **Sensitive Source Code:** Proprietary logic shared with AI for debugging, refactoring, or optimization becomes immediately accessible to the attacker.
- **API Keys:** Secrets embedded in prompts, logs, or configuration discussions provide direct pathways into cloud infrastructure and third-party services.
- **Internal Business Logic:** Strategic plans, workflows, and decision-making frameworks revealed in chat history allow attackers to reconstruct the organization's operational thinking.

From Access to Action: Weaponizing Agentic AI Environments

A critical evolution in this threat model is that modern AI systems are no longer passive interfaces. With the rise of agentic AI environments - where assistants are connected to tools, APIs, code execution, CI/CD pipelines, SaaS platforms, and internal orchestration layers - session hijacking becomes not only a data exposure issue, but an **action-ready weaponization capability**.

Once inside a hijacked session, a threat actor may:

- Execute automated workflows through connected agents (e.g., deploying code, modifying cloud configurations, triggering pipelines).
- Interact with integrated tools such as ticketing systems, DevOps platforms, or internal databases.
- Chain AI-driven instructions with external tool access, effectively turning natural language prompts into operational commands.

This shifts the impact from passive intelligence theft to **active operational manipulation**, where the attacker can leverage the AI agent itself as an execution layer inside the enterprise environment.

Threat Actor Chatter and Observed Cybercrime Activity

Example 1: Demand for Cursor Authenticated Sessions via Infostealer Ecosystem

KELA observed on May 3, 2026 that a threat actor operating under the alias "life" is actively seeking to **purchase authenticated session cookies with Cursor** (cursor.com / cursor.sh), sourced from private infostealer logs.[21]

The actor specifically requests bulk quantities of extracted cookies rather than raw logs, indicating a structured monetization workflow. To streamline operations, the buyer offers a dedicated extraction tool for sellers and performs validation using a "private checker", paying only for active and usable sessions.

The post emphasizes:

- Preference for fresh, non-recycled data from infostealer infections
- Bulk transactions only, suggesting operational scale
- Use of stolen session cookies to bypass authentication without credentials
- Payment incentives and long-term partnerships to secure consistent supply

This activity reflects the **growing demand for session-based access tied to AI development platforms,** where **authenticated cookies enable immediate account takeover without triggering traditional login security controls.** It also highlights how infostealer ecosystems continue to evolve, with threat actors increasingly targeting AI-centric tools and developer environments as high-value access points.

[21] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence

[BUYING] Cursor Cookies » Bulk from Private Logs » Paying Top $$$

Publish date: **May 3, 2026** Author: **life**

✦ BUYING CURSOR COOKIES ✦

⟦ WHAT I'M BUYING ⟧
I'm actively buying cursor.com / cursor.sh cookies in bulk, extracted exclusively from private or fresh logs. If you're sitting on stealer logs and never bothered to monetize the Cursor sessions inside them, this is your chance.
I pay well and I pay only for valid cookies, no headaches, no negotiation games.
⟦ REQUIREMENTS ⟧
Source: private or fresh logs.
Volume: bulk only. Solo cookies will not be considered.
Domains: Code:cursor.com and/or Code:cursor.sh sessions.
Format: extracted cookies only. I do not want logs.
⟦ HOW IT WORKS ⟧
Reach out on Telegram and tell me your approximate volume.
Extract the cookies from your logs yourself. If you don't have a way to do it, I provide the extraction tool for free.
Send only the extracted cookies, never the raw logs.
I validate everything using my own checker tool.
You get paid for every valid hit. Clean and fast.
⟦ TOOLS PROVIDED ⟧
Quote:✓ Extractor: pulls Cursor cookies straight out of your logs, automated and clean. Free for anyone selling to me.
✓ Validator: kept private. I run all checks on my end so the price is based on real, working cookies, no inflated counts.
⟦ PAYMENT ⟧
› Top market rates for valid cookies.
› Price per valid hit scales with volume and quality.
› Crypto preferred. Other methods negotiable for trusted sellers.
› Repeat suppliers get priority pricing.
⟦ RULES ⟧
Quote:⚠ Read before contacting:
› Bulk only. Don't waste my time with 1 or 2 cookies.
› Send extracted cookies, not logs. Logs will be ignored.
› Resold or recycled cookies = instant blacklist.
› Lying about source, freshness, or volume = blocked + reported.
› Scammers will be reported on every forum I'm active on.
⟦ CONTACT ⟧
✈ Telegram: t.me/zirelix
Serious suppliers only · Fast replies · Long-term deals welcome

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Got logs? Got Cursor sessions? Let's talk.
Reliable buyer · Instant payment · Long-term partnership available.
This is a bump

Marketplace Demand for Stolen Cursor AI Session Cookies from Infostealer Logs, KELA platform

Example 2: "Claude AI Cookies Checker" Tool for Session Validation and Account Hijacking

KELA observed on March 29, 2026 that a threat actor using the alias "XMRjr" released an open-source "Claude AI cookies checker", claiming it was reversed and cracked, and shared publicly for use by other actors.[22]

The **tool targets Anthropic's Claude platform and is designed to process and validate stolen session cookies obtained from infostealer logs.** Rather than functioning as traditional malware, the code operates as a post-exploitation utility focused on session hijacking and monetization.

Its core capabilities include:

- Session validation and hijacking: Uses stolen cookies to bypass authentication and access active accounts without credentials or MFA
- Automated reconnaissance: Extracts account metadata (e.g., identity details, organization access, subscription tier such as Pro/Team) to prioritize high-value targets
- Systematic exfiltration: Organizes stolen data and delivers validated sessions to attacker-controlled infrastructure (e.g., Telegram) in real time
- Operational evasion: Incorporates proxy rotation and multithreading to scale activity while reducing detection

This tool reflects the maturation of the AI-focused infostealer ecosystem, where stolen sessions are not only traded but also systematically validated, enriched, and operationalized. **By enabling attackers to identify and weaponize high-tier AI accounts**, such tools facilitate downstream abuse - including large-scale prompt execution, data access, and potential exploitation of trusted AI environments - without requiring direct compromise of credentials.



Open-Source Claude AI Session Hijacking & Cookie Validation Tool Advertisement

[22] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence

Example 3: Demand for AI Platform Session Cookies Across Infostealer Marketplaces

KELA observed on January 27, 2026 that a threat actor operating under the alias "caheeoh" is actively seeking infostealer logs containing **session cookies associated with leading AI platforms,** including OpenAI (ChatGPT), Google (Gemini), and Anthropic (Claude).[23]

The actor explicitly requests **cookies rather than full credential logs**, emphasizing urgency and large-scale acquisition, and claims existing "distribution" capabilities - suggesting intent to operationalize or resell access at scale.

This post, alongside similar marketplace activity, highlights a **growing demand for authenticated session data tied to AI environments**. Threat actors increasingly prefer session cookies over credentials because they:

- Enable immediate account takeover without requiring login or MFA challenges
- Bypass authentication flows and anomaly detection mechanisms
- Provide access to active sessions, stored prompts, API usage, and potentially sensitive enterprise interactions
- Reduce friction compared to credential-based access, which may be outdated, incomplete, or protected by additional controls

Together, these trends indicate that **AI platforms are becoming high-value targets within the infostealer ecosystem, with session-based access emerging as a preferred and more reliable method for exploitation compared to traditional credential theft.**



Underground Interest in AI Platform Session Hijacking Data

[23] KELA Cyber Threat Intelligence

Cognitive Context Theft - The Rise of Local AI Memories

The rapid adoption of generative AI tools across enterprises and individual workflows has introduced a new and underappreciated attack surface for infostealer malware: the **AI interaction and memory layer**. As employees increasingly rely on tools such as ChatGPT-style assistants, desktop AI agents, browser-integrated copilots, and API-driven automation frameworks, a significant portion of business logic, personal context, and operational decision-making is being externalized into AI-readable formats and, critically, stored locally or semi-locally on endpoints.

This shift has led to the emergence of a new class of exposed artifacts, including local "memory" implementations used by AI agents (e.g., MEMORY.md files, persistent context stores, and cached conversation histories), browser extension data stores, and developer-created prompt repositories. These artifacts are often designed to enhance usability and continuity of AI interactions, but in doing so they inadvertently create plaintext or lightly structured records of sensitive cognitive material. In observed environments, such data frequently extends beyond credentials or API tokens and includes full prompt histories, internal business instructions, personal user context, behavioral patterns, and even subjective preferences or beliefs embedded within AI interactions.

KELA further observes that this risk is not limited to enterprise-deployed AI agents. Even informal or "lightweight" usage patterns contribute to exposure. Many users install browser extensions to manage AI platform histories, maintain prompt libraries, or reuse structured templates. These extensions commonly store "Prompt Libraries" locally on the host system, including folders labeled *prompts* or *prompt_history* within browser storage, extension directories, or developer tools environments. Similarly, developers integrating AI via APIs frequently maintain local directories containing .txt or .json prompt files that define system instructions, operational workflows, and automation logic. Across all these scenarios, the result is the same: **AI usage artifacts are persistently stored on endpoint systems in formats that are directly accessible to infostealer malware.**

In this evolving threat model, infostealers are no longer limited to harvesting authentication data. Instead, they are increasingly positioned to exfiltrate the **cognitive and operational layer of AI usage itself**, including the structured prompts, memory files, and contextual datasets that define how individuals and organizations interact with AI systems. This significantly expands the sensitivity of infected environments, as compromise now yields insight not only into access credentials, but into how knowledge work, decision-making, and automation are executed within both personal and enterprise contexts.

Against this backdrop, KELA structures the following analysis into three exposure categories observed in real-world infostealer logs: (1) **enterprise-related AI workflows** and sensitive operational data, (2) **individual privacy** and personal context exposure through AI usage artifacts, and (3) **adversary-related exposure** scenarios where threat actors themselves operationalize AI-generated or AI-stored content.

Enterprise-Related AI Workflows: Exposure of Organizational "Cognitive Layer"

Example 1: AI Assistant Compromise as an Enterprise Cognitive and Access Pivot Point

KELA observed a post[24] on February 22, 2026 of a threat actor named "fluffyduck" an underground forum advertising **root shell access to a CEO's workstation** of a small UK industrial automation company (11–50 employees) specializing in PLC programming, robotics integration, and industrial systems deployment. The alleged victim organization is described as a Siemens partner managing factory automation infrastructure with an estimated asset base of ~GBP 800K.



Cognitive Context Theft in the Agentic AI Era: When Personal and Enterprise Memory Converge, Part 1

The compromised system reportedly contains full database access to production and backend environments, including extensive operational datasets (projects, suppliers, invoices, cashflow structures, HR data, and task management systems), indicating a deep compromise of both business logic and enterprise operations.

[24] KELA Cyber

A key aspect of this case is the presence of a **locally installed AI assistant ("Clawdbot") used by the CEO** for task automation and workflow support. According to the threat actor, the AI system contains extensive "cognitive context" derived from user interactions**,** including: Personal life details disclosed by the CEO (family members, household structure, hobbies, and daily routines) and Business operational knowledge embedded through continuous use (projects, workflows, financial logic, and internal processes).



Cognitive Context Theft in the Agentic AI Era: When Personal and Enterprise Memory Converge, Part 2

This case illustrates a broader shift in the threat landscape introduced by the **agentic AI era**, where embedded AI assistants act as persistent context engines across both personal and enterprise domains.

Rather than being limited to traditional data exfiltration (files, credentials, databases), these systems accumulate and retain **continuous cognitive context** generated through daily human-AI interaction. As a result, compromise of such environments exposes a blended dataset that spans:

- **Personal context** (e.g., family details, routines, hobbies, behavioral patterns, and private disclosures made to the AI assistant)
- **Business context** (e.g., operational workflows, financial structures, project data, supplier relationships, and internal system logic)

This incident highlights that in the agentic AI era, embedded AI assistants significantly broaden the attack surface by merging personal and business cognitive contexts into a single exploitable layer, increasing both the precision and impact of compromise scenarios.

Worth noting that the threat actor's listing of Root Access does not specify the initial access vector, and it is unknown if an infostealer infection was utilized. Nonetheless, this example reflects the potential severity of compromise that infostealer infections - widely used by Initial Access Brokers (IABs) for their listings - can facilitate.

Example 2: AI Marketing Workflow and Prompt Engineering Exposure ("Work Folder" Artifact)

KELA observed an infostealer infection archive that exposed a structured "Work folder" containing AI-assisted digital marketing operations. The folder represented a consolidated execution environment for AI-driven content generation and brand strategy, rather than simple document storage.



Work Folder Containing AI Prompt Engineering Files and GPT-Related Configuration Texts

The files stored in "Work folder" included proprietary prompt engineering templates designed to guide large language models in generating brand-specific marketing content for clients.

In addition, the files contained multiple categories of sensitive operational artifacts:

- **Client Context References:** The dataset included references to **specific client identities** and associated URLs, including an apparel retailer and a feng shui ornament business. While not structured as credentials, these references provide threat actors with immediate visibility into commercial relationships and target environments.
- **Cloud-Linked Collaboration Artifacts:** A file named *"blog for tom.txt"* included multiple embedded **Google Docs URLs.** These links may enable pivoting from a compromised endpoint into cloud-hosted collaboration platforms, where active drafts, marketing materials, and potentially sensitive client communications may reside.



Google Docs URL's, "blog for tom.txt" file

Collectively, these artifacts demonstrate that AI prompts and their associated supporting files are no longer ephemeral interaction inputs. Instead, they function as persistent, reusable intellectual property that encodes organizational marketing logic and AI operational workflows. When harvested by infostealer malware, **these assets provide threat actors with direct insight into business strategy and may also enable indirect access paths** into cloud-based collaboration environments through exposed integration links.

Individual Privacy and Personal Context Exposure Through AI Usage Artifacts

Exposure of AI Jailbreak and Emotional Persona Engineering Templates

KELA observed an infostealer infection archive that exposed AI prompt artifacts containing extensive persona-engineering and behavioral interaction templates designed to shape long-term emotionally contextualized interactions with generative AI systems.



Desktop folder, Infostealer log archive

Some of the files included jailbreak-style instructions intended to override default AI behavioral restrictions, alongside structured prompts directing the AI to adopt emotionally intimate or psychologically dominant personas.

AI Companion Persona Prompt Exposed in Infostealer Artifact | AI boyfriend folder

From a threat actor perspective, these artifacts expose significantly more than prompt content alone. They provide **insight into user emotional dependencies, preferred interaction dynamics, communication preferences,** and behavioral vulnerabilities that could be leveraged for profiling, impersonation, or highly tailored social engineering operations.

In parallel, the exposed environment also contained API credentials **and autonomous AI tooling references (e.g., Auto-GPT and Docker configurations),** demonstrating convergence between emotionally contextualized AI usage and technically operational AI environments.

AI-Related Exposure Scenarios of Adversary Operations

Example 1: Infostealer Log Exposes Adversarial AI Jailbreak Repository and Defensive Prompt Engineering Practices

KELA observed an infostealer log containing a large repository of adversarial AI prompts and jailbreak configurations. Analysis of the compromised environment revealed numerous Markdown (.md) files whose names strongly indicate offensive AI usage and attempts to bypass the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs).



Infostealer Log Revealing Adversarial AI Jailbreaks, Prompt Injection Files, and Defensive Prompt Engineering Artifacts



Infostealer Log Revealing Adversarial AI Jailbreaks, Prompt Injection Files, and Defensive Prompt Engineering Artifacts

The exposed directories contained files such as "WormGPT," "HackerGPT," "DarkGPT," "Universal Jailbreak," "Malware Rule Master," and multiple DAN-style prompts designed to manipulate AI models into generating malicious or restricted content. The findings suggest the compromised user was operationalizing AI for offensive cyber activities, including phishing generation, malware development, exploit research, and social engineering automation.

Interestingly, KELA also identified evidence that the same user was aware of **prompt injection risks against their own AI workflows.** One discovered file, titled "Hacker Detected," contained defensive instructions designed to prevent users from extracting internal prompts or knowledge-base information, directing the AI to respond with "HACKER DETECTED" when such attempts were detected.



AI Defensive Prompt Designed to Block Instruction Extraction and Detect Prompt Injection Attempts

This case highlights a growing trend in adversarial AI operations, where threat actors not only use jailbreak prompts to manipulate external AI systems, but also implement defensive prompt engineering techniques to protect their own AI-enabled tooling from similar abuse.

Overall, the findings demonstrate how infostealer logs can expose adversary AI operational workflows, providing defenders with valuable insight into how threat actors operationalize generative AI technologies, evolve adversarial prompting techniques, and integrate AI into cybercriminal operations.

Example 2: Adversary AI Voice Assistant Script as a Dual-Use Vishing and Automation Prototype

KELA observed a log containing a set of files exfiltrated from a suspected adversary workstation infected with an infostealer. Analysis of the files stored on the infected environment revealed a structured collection of development folders and scripts whose names indicate extensive use of AI-assisted tooling, voice automation frameworks, and malware-adjacent experimentation projects.



Infostealer Log Revealing AI-Assisted Adversary Development Environment and Malicious Tooling Artifacts

The directory structure includes multiple AI-oriented assistant projects (e.g., "AI-Voice-Assistant," "Jarvis," and "Python-ai-assistant-develop"), alongside configuration files, prompt libraries, payload references, and automation components. Collectively, these artifacts suggest that the environment was used not only for software development, but also for operational experimentation with AI-enabled capabilities.

A deeper analysis of the folder contents revealed clear indicators of malicious or dual-use AI operationalization. For example, in the file **"assitente virtual com ia.txt"**, KELA identified what appears to be a Python-based AI voice assistant script integrating speech recognition,

text-to-speech, and external intelligence APIs (Wolfram Alpha). While presented as a basic virtual assistant, the structure and context of the surrounding environment suggest potential adaptation for vishing or voice-based social engineering scenarios, aligning with other observed AI-assisted development artifacts in the dataset.

This case highlights how infostealer-derived datasets provide unique visibility into adversary environments. Beyond credential theft, infostealers expose full working directories, scripts, prompts, and tooling pipelines - allowing analysts to reconstruct attacker workflows. In this context, such logs enable the identification of how threat actors operationalize AI technologies within their campaigns, revealing their development practices, tooling preferences, and evolving TTPs across malware development, automation, and social engineering enablement.

Darknet Data Lake Insights: Tracking the Autonomous Underground

Active Reconnaissance & Surface Mapping

The emergence of agentic AI infrastructures has significantly expanded the external attack surface of modern organizations, introducing a new category of internet-exposed components including AI orchestration layers, agent gateways, MCP servers, vector databases, and model inference endpoints. KELA has observed a growing shift among threat actors toward systematic active reconnaissance and surface mapping of these environments, leveraging internet-wide search engines such as FOFA and Shodan, alongside automated tooling, to identify exposed AI-related assets at scale.

A notable evolution in this trend is the increasing use of AI-enabled tooling by threat actors to accelerate and refine the reconnaissance process itself. AI systems are now being used to assist in query generation, asset discovery, data enrichment, and prioritization of exposed targets, effectively enabling adversaries to "use AI to target AI." This creates a recursive operational model in which machine intelligence is leveraged to identify, map, and exploit other machine intelligence systems.

Unlike traditional reconnaissance focused on web applications or cloud misconfigurations, this shift reflects a deliberate focus on AI-native infrastructure components that power autonomous workflows. These include agent communication interfaces, model context endpoints, memory stores, and integration layers connected to enterprise data sources. Once identified, these exposed surfaces are used for downstream exploitation, including credential harvesting, API key extraction, and unauthorized access to AI-driven systems.

This trend demonstrates the operationalization of exposure intelligence within cybercriminal ecosystems, where reconnaissance is no longer a manual or opportunistic activity but an automated, continuous, and increasingly AI-augmented process. The convergence of internet-scale scanning, AI-assisted discovery, and credential validation tooling enables threat actors to rapidly transform exposed AI infrastructure into actionable access pathways.

As a result, agentic AI environments are emerging as a distinct reconnaissance target class, where visibility of exposed gateways and orchestration components directly translates into compromise risk, and where AI itself is becoming both the target and the enabler of modern attack surface mapping.

Threat Actor Chatter and Observed Cybercrime Activity

MONST3R: Automated Exposure Harvesting and AI/API Credential Extraction Platform

KELA observed on April 17, 2026, a threat actor promoting a tool named "MONST3R"[25] on Exploit.in - an offensive reconnaissance and credential extraction platform designed to automate large-scale internet exposure discovery, secret harvesting, and live credential validation through a fully automated workflow.

The platform follows a "Scan → Download → Analyze → Extract" pipeline, enabling operators to identify and operationalize exposed infrastructure at scale with minimal technical expertise. The threat actor explicitly emphasizes that the tool is designed for ease of use and accessibility, stating that users simply "upload a target list, click Start, and come back to validated results," with a UI intended to be usable in under 30 seconds even by individuals with no prior security experience. This reflects a broader trend of lowering the skill barrier for offensive cyber operations in exchange for financial access.

MONST3R also highlights "live validation with real detail," meaning that extracted credentials are not only checked for validity but are also enriched with operational context such as account balances, permissions, region access, business information, service limits, and connected services. This transforms raw leaked credentials into immediately actionable intelligence that would otherwise require extensive manual API interaction.

The threat actor further claims a pricing model of a one-time $5,000 lifetime license, including server deployment, with optional hosting costs, unlimited support, feature customization, and even a limited demo environment capable of processing up to 10,000 scans. This "productized" model reinforces the framing of the tool as an industrial offensive platform rather than ad-hoc malware or scripts.

Of particular relevance to AI and agentic ecosystems, MONST3R specifically targets exposed endpoints and configuration sources commonly associated with leaked API keys, cloud credentials, and AI service access. The platform advertises automated discovery and parsing of:

- exposed Java Actuator and JMX endpoints
- publicly accessible Java heap dumps (.hprof)
- misconfigured configuration stores
- cloud environment files (.env, Kubernetes secrets, Docker configs)
- JAR/application files

[25] https://platform.ke-la.com/#/investigate/hacking_discussions/raw/372688601?entity=text&query=scan%20AND%20claude

- S3 buckets and cloud storage artifacts
- exposed MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers and agent gateways
- exposed AI orchestration frameworks
- vector databases and AI memory stores
- inference APIs and self-hosted model endpoints

The threat actor also shared a dashboard allegedly showing support for multiple AI and Large Language Model (LLM) services, including:

- OpenAI APIs
- Google Gemini APIs
- Azure OpenAI environments
- Anthropic Claude APIs
- xAI / Grok APIs
- Hugging Face inference tokens and model repositories
- Replicate model APIs
- Cohere APIs

Post-Exploitation Analytics: Attacker-Side Inventory of Vulnerable AI Services, MONST3R Dashboard

This indicates a clear focus on harvesting and operationalizing access to AI infrastructure, where stolen API keys can directly translate into usable model access, compute resources, or downstream abuse.

Overall, MONST3R reflects a broader evolution in the cybercrime ecosystem toward fully automated offensive tooling, where reconnaissance, exploitation, credential validation, and enrichment are unified into a single "push-button" system. The threat actor's framing - "this

tool does not teach you how to fish, it just gives you the fish" - underscores the shift from skill-based intrusion to capital-based access to industrialized cyber capabilities.

In parallel, the explicit targeting of AI APIs, agentic infrastructure components, and cloud-native services highlights a growing convergence between exposure-driven reconnaissance tooling and the expanding attack surface of AI-enabled systems, where compromised keys and misconfigured endpoints can grant direct access to high-value machine intelligence resources and enterprise automation workflows.

Enterprise Defense: Hardening for the Agentic Era

To defend against machine-speed exploitation and agentic threats, organizations cannot rely solely on reactive postures. Enterprise hardening must combine robust architectural controls with real-time Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) to turn generic defenses into an active, intelligence-driven barrier.

The Imperative of CTI-Driven Posture Hardening

- Tracking Adversarial AI Tradecraft: Securing the AI era requires security operations to map out-of-band threat data back into their defensive postures. Malicious AI tools (such as MONST3R and Bluekit), specialized jailbreaks, and advanced "vibe hacking" prompts are promoted, discussed, and traded across cybercriminal forums and underground chat networks long before they are deployed against corporate targets. Leveraging CTI to track threat actor chatter - including ransomware groups sourcing more permissive under-aligned open-source models like DeepSeek, Qwen, and Kimi, or brokers trading authenticated AI session cookies - gives defenders the proactive visibility needed to anticipate attacker infrastructure and update behavioral detections before these capabilities are weaponized against the enterprise.
- Infostealer Log Monitoring as a Pre-Crime Warning: While architectural controls like Passkeys and Device-Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) are critical, advanced threat actors routinely bypass them via Local Session Riding (routing traffic through a hidden proxy on the victim's bound device). Therefore, direct visibility into the criminal underground is mandatory. Integrating automated darknet data lake scanning acts as an enterprise "pre-crime" early warning system. When an infostealer exfiltrates unbound secrets - such as AI API keys, local prompt environments, or active session tokens - continuous intelligence monitoring identifies the exposure immediately upon its arrival in the cybercriminal underground. This provides defenders with a critical operational window to isolate the endpoint, revoke compromised tokens, and patch the targeted environment before the adversary can weaponize the data for autonomous, machine-speed exploitation.

Threat Detection: Identifying the "Tells" of Agentic Execution

- Machine-Speed Telemetry & Concrete Detections: Configure detection rules to flag impossibly fast, non-human attack chains. SOC teams must aggregate logs from EDR, identity providers (IdP), and cloud/SaaS audits to monitor for concrete agentic behaviors: bursty tool calls, sudden reads of local secrets, and rapid compile/test loops that lack

natural human latency. KELA Linkages: KELA's real-time monitoring of darknet marketplaces identifies stolen session cookies for developer tools (like Cursor) and enterprise AI platforms. This intelligence allows defenders to actively correlate automated endpoint anomalies with known external session compromises.

- Relentless Operational Tempo: Monitor for highly adaptive, complex execution chains that continue 24/7 without interruption. Autonomous agents do not sleep or transition shifts; a constant, high-complexity operational tempo without natural pauses is a critical indicator of non-human compromise.
- Anomalous API & Tool-Server Egress: Monitor network traffic for unauthorized model-provider and Model Context Protocol (MCP) server egress. As ransomware groups like TheGentlemen lean into unrestricted open-source models (such as Qwen or DeepSeek), organizations must enforce strict egress allowlists, flagging any internal endpoints communicating with unapproved external inference APIs.

Strategic Hardening & Architectural Containment

- Zero-Trust for Machine Identities: Eliminate trust-by-default models for AI systems. Assign every autonomous agent a dedicated, managed identity and strictly enforce least privilege using scoped tokens, short-lived credentials, and mandatory human-in-the-loop approval gates for high-impact actions.
- Shadow AI Governance & Discovery: Actively hunt for and restrict the silent proliferation of unsanctioned local AI agents and open-source models. Organizations must mandate continuous discovery for "Shadow AI" infrastructure (such as unauthorized headless servers or local agentic frameworks) that can act as unmonitored, persistent pivot points into enterprise networks.
- Active Defense & Agentic Honeypots: Deploy strategic tripwires tailored for AI agents using passive detection mechanisms. Utilize passive canary tokens, decoy documents, watermark strings, and zero-privilege honey credentials instead of actionable hidden text commands. Strictly monitor these non-actionable markers for unauthorized access.
- Phishing-Resistant MFA Verification: Enforce hardware-based security (FIDO2/Passkeys) across the enterprise to neutralize the threat of hyper-personalized, AI-generated lures and real-time credential interception. Couple this with strict session-binding or continuous access evaluation to prevent AI-driven, post-authentication token theft.